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Abstract: 
People will, under certain conditions, attribute failure to an external target to avoid an unfavorable self-
evaluation. But to what external target do people attribute failure? Based on Fritz Heider’s analysis of similarity 
and attribution, we predicted that failure—a negative event—would be attributed to a similarly negative 
external target. Participants worked on a task ostensibly created by three other people and received failure 
feedback. Self-awareness was either high or low, and people believed that their likelihood of improving in the 
future was either high or low. The valence of the fictional group members was manipulated such that one 
member was positive, another was mildly negative, and the third was highly negative. As in past research, 
highly self-aware persons who could not improve their failure attributed failure externally, relative to the other 
conditions. Consistent with Heider’s analysis, these participants perceived the negative group members as being 
responsible for their failure relative to self and the positive group member. Implications for the self-serving bias 
are discussed. 
 
Article: 
People typically have many goals and motives simultaneously (Freud, 1923; Heider, 1958; Lewin, 1935), so the 
operation of important motives maybe obscured by parallel or contrary motives. For example, people are 
motivated to maintain a positive self-evaluation by achieving consistency between the self and important 
standards and values (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Silvia &Duval, in press). One consequence of this motive is the 
―self-serving bias‖: people will attribute negative events to external causes to avoid a lowered self-evaluation 
(Federoff &Harvey, 1976). Yet people should not always make self-serving attributions because this is not the 
only important motive. In fact, the influence of additional motives is reflected in the contradictory self- serving 
bias literature. Some studies do find external attributions for failure (e.g., Snyder, Stephan, &Rosenfield, 1976). 
Other studies, however, find internal attributions for failure (e.g., Ames, 1975; Ross, Bierbrauer, &Polly, 1974; 
Weary et al., 1982) or no effect at all. Indeed, a recent meta-analysis (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999) and past re-
views (Zuckerman, 1979) show that self-serving and other- serving attributions are both common findings. 
 
What other motives might be moderating the self-serving bias? Duval and Silvia (in press) suggest that 
attributional motives are a significant factor. People want to be consistent with their standards, but they also 
want to accurately attribute events to their most plausible cause (see Duval & Duval, 1983, for a detailed 
discussion). Such attributions enable a reasonably accurate understanding of the environment’s causal structure 
(Heider, 1944, 1958), which is useful when striving for complex goals. These two motives can be harmonious. 
When self is the most plausible cause for success, for example, an internal attribution will simultaneously 
further self-evaluative and attributional motives. But the two goals can also conflict, such as when self is the 
most plausible cause for failure. An internal failure attribution would satisfy the attributional motive but disrupt 
self– standard congruity. Conversely, an external failure attribution would preserve self–standard congruity but 
thwart the attributional motive. 
 
How do people reconcile these conflicting motives? One possible moderator proposed by Duval and Duval 
(1983, 1987) is peoples’ perceived ability to improve their failure in the future. If people feel that they can 
rapidly improve, then a discrepancy would only be temporary and failure should be attributed internally. But if 
people feel that they cannot improve, an internal attribution would create an irreducible self-discrepancy and its 
resulting negative affect. In this situation an external attribution seems a more optimal reconciliation of the two 
motives. 
 
The effects of perceived ability to improve should be exaggerated by high levels of self-awareness. People are 
keenly aware of the relation between self and standards when their attention is focused on the self (Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972; Silvia &Duval, in press; Silvia & Gendolla, in press). This makes the experience of failure 
much more severe (Ickes, Wicklund, &Ferris, 1973). Conversely, the self-evaluative motive is minimal when 
people are not concerned with whether they are consistent with their standards (Scheier &Carver, 1983); there is 
thus no motive conflict to be reconciled when self-awareness is low. 
 
A series of experiments (Duval &Duval, 1983, 1987; Duval & Silvia, in press) have supported these 
predictions. The general procedure involved giving participants false failure feedback and then manipulating the 
perceived probability of improving in the future. Self-awareness was manipulated by exposing half of the 
participants to their image on a video monitor. When self-awareness was high, people attributed failure 
internally (as measured by an internal– external change score and by the fourfold typology) when they felt they 
could improve; their state self-esteem declined as a result. In contrast, highly self-aware people who perceived 
improvement as unlikely attributed failure externally; their state self-esteem thus remained unchanged. 
 
THE TARGETS OF SELF-SERVING ATTRIBUTIONS 
People will attribute failure externally when self-awareness is high and the likelihood of improving failure is 
low (Duval &Duval, 1983, 1987; Duval & Silvia, in press). But to what external object are people attributing 
failure? What variables determine the targets of self-serving attributions? Such processes have received very 
little attention in the self-serving bias literature. This is surprising, given the presumed links between 
attributions and subsequent action (Heider, 1958). For example, a student who attributes a poor test grade to the 
neighbor’s late-night party will take different actions than a student who attributes failure to the professor’s 
malevolent incompetence. Likewise, consider a job candidate who, not being very qualified, does not get hired. 
An attribution to the employer’s ―lack of good judgment‖ will have different consequences than an attribution 
to ―affirmative action‖ or ―a bad astrological pairing.‖ Indeed, many influential models of prejudice (e.g., 
Allport, 1954; Crocker &Major, 1989) discuss the pivotal social consequences of external attributions for 
personal failings. 
 
One likely determinant of external attributions is the similarity in valence between the failure event and the 
target. In Heider’s (1944, 1958) model, attribution involves connecting cognitions in cause–effect unit relations. 
As with all unit relations, there are pressures toward uniformity between the connected elements; a negative 
event linked to a positive cause would create ―imbalance.‖ People avoid these uncomfortable disruptions of the 
perceptual field by connecting elements that are affectively harmonious. ―Good people‖ are thus seen as 
responsible for ―good things‖ and vice versa. Heider’s perspective thus suggests the intuitive prediction that 
failure—a negative event—will be attributed to an external target that is similarly negative. 
 
Although couched in different theoretical terms, several studies are consistent with Heider’s approach. Regan, 
Straus, and Fazio (1974) manipulated participants’ liking for a target person who then failed or succeeded on a 
task. Attributions for the target’s performance reflected balance processes. The liked person’s failure was 
attributed externally, whereas the disliked person’s failure was attributed internally; this pattern was reversed 
when the target succeeded. In a second study, participants believed that a liked or disliked acquaintance had 
done a favor for another person. The favor (a positive event) was attributed to the liked person’s disposition and 
the disliked person’s situation. Another study (Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, &Elliot, 1998, Study 2) found that 
working closely on task led to greater liking for the dyad partner—in balance terms, the unit relation induced a 
positive sentiment relation. Liking then mediated whether a dyad’s failure was attributed to the other or to the 
self: the other received less blame for failure when viewed positively. This nicely fits a balance theory analysis, 
as the positive valence of the other person was inconsistent with the negative valence of the poor performance. 
 
THE PRESENT STUDY 
We sought to test the influence of event–target similarity in guiding external attributions for failure. We 
―manipulated‖ internal and external attributions by manipulating self-awareness and perceived ability to 
improve. Many experiments have shown that highly self-aware people who feel they can improve will attribute 
failure internally, whereas highly self-aware people who do not expect improvement will attribute failure 
externally (Duval &Duval, 1983, 1987; Duval & Silvia, in press). This enabled us to create a condition in which 
people will attribute failure externally. We also manipulated the affective valence of three possible targets, 
creating one positive target, one mildly negative target, and one highly negative target. 
 
Following past research, we expected highly self-aware people who could not improve to attribute failure 
externally relative to the other three conditions. Within this condition, we expected greater attribution to either 
(or both) of the negative targets relative to self and the positive target. In contrast, we expected highly self-
aware people who could improve to attribute failure internally. Because they perceived the self as responsible, 
they should make minimal attribution to the three external targets. Finally, given that self-evaluation concerns 
are minimal when self-focus is low (Scheier &Carver, 1983; Silvia &Duval, in press), no systematic effects 
were expected in the low self-awareness conditions. 
 
METHOD 
Overview 
Participants worked on a creative problem solving task presumably created by three other (fictional) 
participants, known as A, B, and C. Participant A was mildly negative, Participant B was positive, and 
Participant C was negative. To create a discrepancy, all participants received false failure feedback. Level of 
self-awareness and perceived probability of discrepancy reduction (PDR) were manipulated. Attributions for 
failure to self, A, B, and C were measured. 
 
Participants and Design 
Forty-four participants (16 men and 28 women) enrolled in undergraduate psychology courses participated in 
exchange for extra course credit. Men and women were distributed equally across the conditions. Participants 
were randomly assigned to condition in a 2 (high/low self-awareness) X 2 (high/low PDR) factorial design. 
 
Procedure 
All persons participated individually. Upon entering the lab, the participants were greeted by the experimenter 
and led to a private room. The experimenter explained that the study concerned the dynamics of creative 
problem solving in a group situation, specifically creative processes in the absence of nonverbal cues from other 
group members. Participants were told that they would work on a creative problem solving task with three other 
participants—all nonverbal cues were eliminated by having each group member participate at a different point 
in the semester. 
 
The participants were then introduced to the creative problem solving task, which was a variation of the Remote 
Associations Task (Mednick, 1962). In this task, three words sharing a common associated word (known as a 
―trigram‖) are presented. For example, the associated word to the trigram ―basket, room, base‖ is ―ball,‖ as in 
―basketball, ballroom, baseball.‖ Participants were asked to generate the word associated with all three trigram 
words. To make the task ambiguous and challenging, participants were asked to also generate words associated 
with any one word or combination of words in the trigram. 
 
After being introduced to the task, the participants were told that the three other participants had been randomly 
assigned to be the ―problem creators‖ and that each problem creator had generated 10 trigrams. Participant were 
informed that they were thus the ―problem solver‖—their role was to correctly solve the 30 trigrams generated 
by the three problem creators. 
 
The experimenter stated that because the study was a group experiment, he would like to give the participant 
some information on the other three group members. The participants received contrived personality 
descriptions of the three fictional participants, referred to as A, B, and C. Each personality description contained 
two trait terms taken from Anderson’s (1968) list of valenced traits. The participants were told that the 
personality profiles were intended to familiarize them with the format of the profiles and that more detailed 
personality descriptions would be given later in the session. The participants were then led through three 
practice trigrams to ensure their familiarity with the task. 
 
Self-awareness manipulation. Before beginning the task, the experimenter explained that some sessions were 
randomly chosen to be videotaped so the experimenters could see if the procedure was standard for each 
participant. In the high self-awareness condition, the experimenter further explained that the present session was 
selected to be videotaped. A video camera facing the participant, a video recorder, and a monitor were turned 
on; the participant was only able to see his or her face in the monitor. This is a common (Duval, Duval, & 
Mulilis, 1992; Duval & Lalwani, 1999) and well-validated (Davis &Brock, 1975; Geller & Shaver, 1976; 
Rogers, Miller, Mayer, &Duval, 1982) self- awareness manipulation. In the low self-awareness condition, the 
experimenter stated that the present session had not been randomly chosen to be videotaped, and the video 
equipment was not manipulated. 
 
The participant was given 10 min to work on the 30 trigrams. The experimenter then reentered the room, took 
the answer sheet, and ostensibly went to computer analyze the responses. After 4 min, the experimenter 
returned and gave the participant a printout detailing the results of the supposed computer analysis. All 
participants first received failure feedback. The experimenter directed attention to bold type at the bottom of the 
sheet stating ―Total degree of discrepancy from standard: 20.02%.‖ (Pretesting indicated that people perceived 
20% as a large discrepancy.) 
 
Probability of discrepancy reduction (PDR) manipulation. The experimenter went on to tell the participants that 
the analysis also provided an accurate estimate of their 
 
 
 
ability to improve their performance in the future. Another boldface sentence stated ―Estimated probability of 
improved performance.‖ The probability of improvement was 98.51% in the high PDR condition and 1.51% in 
the low PDR condition. The experimenter reiterated the failure and PDR feedback and asked if the participant 
had any questions. 
 
Target valence manipulation. In order to assess ―impressions of the creative task’s dynamics,‖ the experimenter 
gave the participant the detailed descriptions of the other three participants. Each description was composed of 
10 trait terms with a similar affective valence (Anderson, 1968). Pretesting revealed that Participant A was 
mildly negative (e.g., shy, conforming, and hesitant), Participant B was positive (e.g., modest, confident, and 
idealistic), and Participant C was highly negative (e.g., superstitious, insecure, and eccentric; Ms = 3.8, 5.55, 
and 2.25 on a 7-point scale, with each mean differing significantly from the others). Each ―personality profile‖ 
was followed by the 10 trigrams that the fictional participant had presumably contributed to the 30 total 
trigrams. The trigrams were randomly ascribed to the fictional participants from the list of 30. 
 
The participant was asked to review the personality profiles and trigram lists and then complete a brief 
questionnaire. The questionnaire contained attribution measures, checks on the target valence and PDR 
manipulations, and several filler measures intended to maintain the cover story’s credibility. Causal attributions 
for failure were measured by asking participants four questions: ―To what extent was your performance caused 
by factors associated with yourself/Person A/Person B/Person C?‖; each item was answered on a 7-point scale. 
Participants were debriefed upon completion of the questionnaire. 
 
RESULTS 
The gender variable was not involved in any significant main effects or interactions, so it is not discussed 
further. 
 
Manipulation Checks 
The PDR manipulation’s effectiveness was measured with the item ―To what extent can you improve your per-
formance on the creativity task in the future?‖ An analysis of variance (ANOVA) yielded a sole main effect of 
PDR, F(1, 40) = 43.4,p < .001; as expected, the high PDR conditions expected a greater chance of improvement 
than the low PDR conditions. 
 
Participants were asked ―To what extent do you think you would like Participant A/B/C?‖ as a check on the 
manipulation of targets’ valence. The positive target (M = 4.89) was perceived more positively than both the 
mildly negative target (M = 3.22), t(43) = 6.4,p < .001, and the highly negative target (M = 2.73), t(43) = 6.5,p < 
.001. The mildly and highly negative targets were also perceived as distinct, t(43) = 2.3,p < .024. This pattern 
replicates our pretesting and suggests that the manipulation was successful. 
 
Causal Attributions 
To see if attributions were influenced by our manipulations, we conducted a 2 (self-focus) X 2 (PDR) X 4 (attri-
bution targets) ANOVA with repeated measures on the third factor. This analysis found a main effect for the 
attribution targets and an interaction between PDR and targets (both ps < .001). These were, however, qualified 
by the predicted three-way interaction, F(3, 120) = 19.1,p < .001. We thus conducted additional between- and 
within-condition analyses to clarify the meaning of this interaction, using Girden’s (1992, pp. 59–65) 
recommendations. Attributions to self and the three external targets are shown in Table 1. 
 
Attributions to self. Our between-condition analyses first tested our predictions regarding self-attributions for 
failure. Given past research, we expected the high selfawareness/high PDR condition to attribute failure to self, 
and the high self-awareness/low PDR condition to attribute failure externally. A 2 X 2 ANOVA yielded a 
significant PDR main effect, F(1, 40) = 18.9,p < .002, and a significant interaction, F(1, 40) = 20.9,p < .001. 
The pattern supported our predictions (see Fig. 1). When improvement was likely, high self-awareness led to 
greater self-attribution of failure, t(20) = 3.9,p < .001. When improvement was unlikely, however, high self-
awareness led to less self-attribution, t(20) = 2.71,p < .013. The improvement conditions differed when self-
awareness was high, t(20) = 6.8,p < .001, but not when self-awareness was low, t < 1. This nicely replicates past 
research and indicates that our ―manipulation‖ of internal and external failure attributions was successful. 
 
External attributions to other participants. The second step tested our predictions regarding the predictability of 
external attributions. We conducted analyses within the high self-awarenessllow PDR condition —the only 
condi- 
 
 
tion to attribute failure externally—to see if people defensively attributed failure to positive or negative others. 
Given Heider’s (1944, 1958) analysis of similarity and attribution, we expected greater attribution to the 
negative targets relative to self and the positive target. We conducted paired t tests within this condition to see if 
attributions were affected by event–target similarity. The attribution patterns for the two high self-awareness 
conditions are shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Participants attributed more causality for failure to the mildly negative partner, t(10) = 4.4,p < .001, and the 
highly negative partner, t(10) = 4.2,p < .002, than to self. Self-attribution did not differ from attribution to the 
positive partner, t = 1.01, ns. This shows that people indeed saw external causes as more responsible for their 
own failure. 
 
External attribution was also specific to the negative targets. Participants attributed more causality to the mildly 
negative partner than to the positive partner, t(10) = 3.8, p < .003. The highly negative partner was also seen as 
more responsible for failure than the positive partner, t(10) = 3.6,p < .004. The two negative partners did not 
differ, t < 1. This shows that the negative targets were both seen as more responsible for failure than self or the 
positive possible target. 
 
DISCUSSION 
People frequently attribute failure externally, but what external target of all possible targets is perceived as 
responsible for failure? Heider’s (1944, 1958) model of attribution suggests that similarity between the failure 
event and the possible target is relevant. In this model, people form cause–effect unit relations to create and 
maintain a simple and consistent view of the environment. One aspect of consistency is the extent to which 
connected elements have similar valences. A unit relation composed of dissimilar elements, such as perceiving 
a nice person as the cause of a bad event, creates an uncomfortable sense of imbalance. The formation of 
attributions is thus guided in part by the goal of establishing affectively harmonious unit relationships. 
 
The present study extended Heider’s (1958) reasoning to defensive failure attributions. Failure, a negative 
event, should be attributed to a similarly negative external target; this attribution would establish a harmonious 
unit relationship. An experiment demonstrated the importance of event– target similarity in this process. People 
who attributed failure externally (the high self-awarenessl low PDR group) were able to attribute failure to a 
positive person, a mildly negative person, or a highly negative person. As expected, significantly more causality 
for failure was attributed to the two negative targets relative to the positive target. 
 
The present study also replicated previous findings on the effects of self-awareness and perceived ability to 
improve on performance attributions. Highly self-aware people who felt they could improve attributed failure to 
self, whereas highly self-aware people who did not expect to improve attributed failure externally. Ability to 
improve had no effect when self-awareness was low; self–standard consistency concerns were minimized, so 
there was no conflict 
 
 
 
 
between self-esteem and attributional motives. Evidence for internal failure attributions clearly contradicts the 
strong view of the self-serving bias, which assumes that the self- esteem motive is paramount. It is fully 
consistent, however, with past studies (Ames, 1975; Duval &Duval, 1983, 1987; Ross et al., 1974; Weary et al., 
1982) and the general position that action is determined by the interplay of multiple simultaneous motives 
rather than a single imperialistic drive (Heider, 1958; Lewin, 1935). 
 
Future research should isolate other predictors of external attributions. The usual attribution suspects, such as 
contiguity and covariation, seem promising. Another possibility is ―substantiality,‖ which is the subjective sense 
of magnitude (Duval &Duval, 1983; see also Bruner & Postman, 1948). People typically perceive substantial 
events (e.g., a huge political scandal) as being due to substantial causes (e.g., a vast conspiracy). Persons with 
Christian beliefs, for example, often perceive God as the cause of substantial positive events, such as an averted 
catastrophe, but rarely as the cause of trivial positive events, such as finding misplaced car keys (Lupfer, Brock, 
& DePaola, 1992). Testing additional facets of a balance approach is another goal for later work. The present 
study was only concerned with predicting the targets of failure attributions. A comprehensive extension of 
balance theory to self-serving attribution should consider success attributions as well as attributions for events 
that are linked with but not caused by the self, such as the failure of a favorite sports team. 
 
Reconsidering Attributional Typologies 
One reason why so little attention has been paid to the targets of external attributions is the popularity of the 
―attribution typology.‖ Many studies have used attributions to ability, effort, task difficulty, and luck as the 
measure of attributional egotism. Ability and effort represent internal dimensions that are stable and unstable, 
whereas task difficulty and luck represent external dimensions that are stable and unstable. This typology is 
traced to Heider (1958), although Heider’s primary concern was clearly the interpersonal function of attribution 
and not the narrow domain of performance attribution. Attributions, in his model, primarily serve to gain 
information about the dispositions and motives of other people, thus enabling a predictable and manageable 
social environment. 
 
The attribution typology has some serious problems. It’s unclear what an attribution to ―luck‖ means 
psychologically. Are people agnostically saying they do not know an event’s cause, or do they really believe a 
mysterious force has influenced the outcome? Furthermore, ―ability‖ and ―task difficulty‖ are two sides of the 
same coin; a task is only difficult relative to a person’s ability level. And ultimately the fourfold typology, like 
all typologies, is ―convenient and seductive‖ (Allport, 1961, p. 17)—it does not illuminate the process of 
attribution. No one attributes being spurned by a lover to ―task difficulty‖ or ―effort‖; no one attributes an 
altruistic act to ―luck‖ or a hate crime to ―ability.‖ These actions are instead attributed to the dispositions, 
intentions, and motives of other people (Heider, 1958). The attribution typology thus obscures the basic 
interpersonal character and implications of causal attribution; future research should pursue more viable 
measures. 
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